State of Utah v. Robin M. LaFond : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. Robin M. LaFond : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Attorney General's Office; Counsel for Appellee.
Happy J. Morgan; Counsel for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. LaFond, No. 20010970 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3588
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ROBIN M.LAFOND, 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
CaseNo.20010970-CA 
Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is a direct appeal from a conviction of possession of 
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2XaXi), entered in the Seventh District Court of Grand County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Lyie R. Anderson, Judge, presiding. 
HAPPY J. MORGAN 
8 SOUTH 100 EAST 
MOAB, UTAH 84532 
TELEPHONE: (435)259-9418 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
ATTN. CRIMINAL APPELLATE DIVISION 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 
MAY 1 5 ; JI 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
: Case No. 20010970-CA 
ROBIN M.LAFOND, 
: Priority No, 2 (incarcerated) 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This is a direct appeal from a conviction of possession of 
methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-8(2)(aXi), entered in the Seventh District Court of Grand County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Lyle R Anderson, Judge, presiding. 
HAPPY J. MORGAN 
8 SOUTH 100 EAST 
MOAB, UTAH 84532 
TELEPHONE: (435)259-9418 
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT 
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE 
ATTN. CRIMINAL APPELLATE DIVISION 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH, 6TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-0854 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of Jurisdiction 1 
Issue, Preservation and Standards of Review 1 
Constitutional Provisions 2 
Statement of the Case 3 
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition 3 
Statement of Facts 3 
Summary of Arguments 8 
Argument 9 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE CLEARLY 
FRRONFOUS 9 
H. THE TRIAL COURTS LEGAL ANALYSIS WAS INCORRECT 10 
A. THE TROOPER'S QUESTIONING VIOLATED THE SCOPE OF 
THE STOP 11 
B. THE TROOPER'S SEARCH OF MS. LAFOND WAS NOT BASED 
ON PROBABLE CAUSE OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES . . . 14 
C. IF THE TROOPER'S CONDUCT AMOUNTED ONLY TO A 
FRISK, IT WAS STILL UNJUSTIFIED 16 
D. THE FRISK DID NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE 
SEARCH 17 
Conclusion 18 
Addendum 
1. Judgment and Commitment 
I 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Illinois v. Gates. 462 LIS. 213 (1983) 15,16 
Minnesota v. Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366(1993) 18 
People v.Mills. 115 111. App.3d 809,450 N.E.2d 935,71 111. Dec. 247 (1983) 13 
People v. Superior Court of Yolo County. 3 Cal.3d 821,478 P.2d 457, 
91 Cal. Rptr. 737 13 
Reid v. Georgia. 448 U.S. 438 (1980) 14 
Sibronv. New York. 392 U.S. 40 (1968) 15 
Spencev. State. 525 So.2d 442 (Fla. App. 1988) 13 
State v. Cvr. 501 A.2d 1303 (Me. 1985) 13 
State v.Eldredge. 773 P.2d 29 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989) 2 
State v.Gamblin. 2000 UT 44,1 P.3d 1108 2 
State v.Hansen. 2000 UT 353,17 P.3d 1135, cert granted 26 P.3d 35, 
2001 Utah LEXIS 102 11,12,14 
State v.Hodson. 866 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1993), rev'don other grounds, 907 P.2d 1155 
(Utah 1995) 15,16 
State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 74.10P.3d346 1 
States v.Larocco. 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 15,16 
State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App. 106,999 P.2d 1252 1 
State v. Lopez. 873 P.2d 1127 (Utqah 1994) 11 
State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987) 14 
State v. Moreno. 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.), cert denied 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996) . . . . 2 
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d431 (Utah App. 1990) 13 
Statev.Sehlosser. 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) 13,14 
State v.Warren. 2001 UT App. 346,37 P.3d 270 17 
State v. White. 856 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1993) 17 
United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 
(1999) 2 
United States v. Santillanes. 848 P.2d 556 (Utah App. 1993) 15 
United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991) 14 
Wong Sun y, United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 16 
STATUTES. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution ofUtah, Article I § 14 2,16 
United States Constitution, Amendment TV 2,16 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 3 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37a-5 3 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) 1 
ii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Robin M. LaFond, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
AH 0 2 ?m 
+JZJ 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER 
Case No. 20010970-CA 
This case is before the court on Defendant's motion for 
summary reversal for manifest error under Rule 10(a)(3) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The State opposed the 
motion, and filed a motion for summary affirmance on the basis 
that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to 
merit further consideration by the appellate court. See Utah 
R. App. P. 10(a)(2). 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions for summary 
disposition are denied and deferred pending plenary 
presentation and consideration of the appeal. 
J 
DATED this / d a y of April, 2002. 
FOR THE COURT: 
lj&-
William A. Thofne Jr., Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on April 2, 2002, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114 
HAPPY MORGAN 
GRAND COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER 
8 S 100 E 
MOAB UT 84532 
Dated this April 2, 2002. 
V a^UT /UJL/O^^J^-^S) By 
De^utW C l e r k 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
: CascNo.20010970-CA 
ROBIN M.LAFOND, 
: Priority No. 2 (incarcerated) 
Defendant/Petitioner. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ana §78-2a-3(2Xe) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this second 
degree felony conviction from a court of record. 
The trial court signed the judgment, sentence and conviction on December 5,2001 
(R. 113). 
Defense counsel filed the notice of appeal on December 6,2001 (R. 115). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION1 
1
 At this juncture, counsel believes that all issues were property preserved below. 
However, appellate standards for preservation of issues change occasionally. Compare. 
S4„ State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,10 P.3d 346 (generally, parties must raise insufficiency 
in the trial court); with State v. Tarsen. 2000 UT App. 106, at f 9 n.4, 999 P,2d 1252 (party 
may challenge sufficiency of the evidence on appeal in the absence of specific motion or 
objection in trial court). 
Accordingly, out of an abundance of caution, to the extent that any issue raised 
herein was not properly preserved at trial, counsel relies on the plain error doctrine to 
raise the issues on appeal. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
Did the trial court err in denying Ms. Lafond's motion to suppress? 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the Court reviews die 
findings of fact with the deferential clearly erroneous standard, and requires a party 
challenging a finding of fact to marshal all evidence and inferences sustaining that finding. 
See, £ £ , Stats, V, MOfCTQ, 910 P.2d 1245,1247 (Utah App.), ss& denied, 916 P.2d 909 
(Utah 1996); State v. Gamblin. 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2,1 P.3d 1108. The Court reviews 
legal conclusions for correctness, and grants trial courts a measure of discretion in applying 
law to facts. Moreno, supra. 
This issue was properly preserved by pre-trial motion (R. 17), argument (R. 128 (T. 
5/1/2001)), and the entry of a conditional plea (R. 94). 
CONSTUVnONAL PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions pertain: 
Constitution of Utah, Article § 14 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge. 773P.2d 
29,35 and n.8 (Utah), fieri denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). 
Constitutional errors are particularly appropriate for correction under the plain 
error doctrine. See, &&, United States v. Lindsay. 184 F.3d 1138,1140 (10th Cir.), £e& 
denied, 145 L.E<L2d 343 (1999). 
2 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASK COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Ms. Lafond by information with one count of possession of a 
controlled substance, methamphetamine, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8(2XaX0; and one count of possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (R. 1-2). 
Magistrate Lyle R. Anderson presided over the preliminary hearing and ordered Ms. 
Lafond bound over as charged (R. 15). She pled not guilty at arraignment (R. 13). 
Counsel for Ms. Lafond moved to suppress the evidence (R. 17), and after the motion 
was submitted on the factual basis set forth in the transcript of the preliminary hearing 
briefing, the trial court denied the motion (R. 26-29). 
Counsel filed a petition for interlocutory appeal, which this Court denied (R. 34,89). 
Ms. Lafond pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine, reserving her right to appeal 
from the denial of the motion to suppress, and Judge Anderson sentenced her to prison (R. 90-
98,112-113). 
Counsel filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 115). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3 
Utah Highway Patrol Officer Steve Salis stopped a car for speeding and for having 
an unlit license plate, and Lafond was the passenger (R. 129 at 4-6). The driver said he had 
no license, but had an identification card, and Ms. Lafond interjected, saying that she 
owned the car and was not driving because she was tired (R. 129 at 6). The trooper asked 
the driver about die status of his license, and the driver said his license had been suspended 
for DUL that he was eligible to apply for a license, and that he had yet to do so (R. 129 at 
6). 
The officer noticed the driver holding a large cup, and also saw a purple Crown 
Royal bag on the front seat between the driver and passenger (R 129 at 6). The driver did 
not seem impaired and the officer detected no suspicious odors (R. 129 at 15). 
The trooper explained that he had stopped them for speeding and because the license 
plate light was not working (R. 129 at 6). He asked Lafond for the registration (R. 129 at 
6). She looked on the front seat and floor board, and grabbed a small coin or cigarette 
purse and put it between her legs, and then began going through the glove box (R. 129 at 
7). 
As she was looking for the registration, the trooper shone his flashlight inside the 
car and saw a very small number of very small green particles in a cup holder and believed 
they were marijuana (R. 129 at 7). He admitted that he could not say one way or another if 
they were (R 129 at 15). He admitted that he was uncertain if they were marijuana (R 129 
at 15-16). Ultimately, no marijuana was found in the car (R 129 at 10). 
4 
Lafond handed him the registration, which appeared correct, and he when he asked 
for proof of insurance, she seemed kind of startled, but said that she had that and began 
going through the glove box again (R. 129 at 7). She was moving fast, and appeared 
nervous (R 129 at 7). He did not get proof of insurance (R. 129 at 17). 
The trooper then asked the driver and passenger if there were anything illegal in the 
car (R. 129 at 7). Lafond said she had nothing illegal in the car, and only had rocks in the 
trunk (R. 129 at 8). He asked if she had weapons or alcohol in the car, and she said she did 
not (R. 129 at 8). He asked if she had any marijuana in the car, and she said she did not (R 
129 at 8). He asked if, to her knowledge, anyone had smoked marijuana in the car 
recently, and she said she was not sure but did not think so (R 129 at 8). She explained 
that she had lent the car to a friend of hers for about a week, and had just retrieved it that 
morning (R 129 at 8). 
The trooper asked Lafond if he could search the car for those items and she said he 
could (R. 129 at 8). She only gave consent to a search of the car and did not consent to a 
search of herself (R. 129 at 12). 
The trooper had Lafond step out of the car first, and when she got out, she brought 
the small leather purse, some cigarettes, and a brown leather bag from the floor of the car 
(R. 129 at 8). As she was getting out, the trooper walked around the front of the car and 
ordered her to sit on the ground toward the front of the car, and he saw her put her hands in 
her pockets (R. 129 at 8). He asked her what she had in her pockets, and she said she did 
5 
not place anything in them (R. 129 at 9). He told her to remove the bag she had put in her 
pocket (R. 129 at 9). She pulled out the brown learner purse and put it on the hood of the 
car (R. 129 at 9). He could see her other pocket bulging and told her to remove the other 
brown leather bag from that pocket also (R 129 at 9). 
She said she did not have anything in her pocket and put her hand in it, and when he 
reached for her, she dropped a black leather coin purse on the ground (R. 129 at 9). He 
picked it up and asked her what it was (R 129 at 9). She said she did learner work, and 
was evasive (R. 129 at 9). He told her he needed her to stand still and face away from him, 
and he patted down the pocket and felt what he believed was a pipe (R 129 at 9). Heasked 
her if she would remove it from her pocket and she said she would not (R. 129 at 9). He 
reached in her pocket and removed a torch, a glass pipe, and a glass jar containing 
suspected methamphetamine (R. 129 at 9-10). He searched her, had her empty her pockets, 
and put her in front of the car on the road (R 129 at 10). He had the driver exit and did the 
same with him (R 129 at 10). He cuffed them both and searched the car, finding nothing 
(R 129 at 10). 
The two bags he took from her were empty and the Crown Royal bag contained 
nothing illegal (R 129 at 12). He did not smell any alcohol or other illegal substance (R. 
129 at 15). 
When asked why he searched the car, he testified, 
Well, first of all, just the demeanor of the female subject She was -
while I was talking to the subject she was moving very fest She appeared to 
6 
be very nervous, more nervous than others. She kept looking on the seat and 
down on the floor. She picked up a brown leather purse and placed it on the 
seat in between her legs, as if she was concealing it. There was a Crown 
Royal bag, which was not on the seat, which had something in it, which I did 
not know if it was Crown Royal bottle or what was inside of it. The driver 
was holding a large refill cup, and his license was, also, suspended for a 
previous DUI. While looking or shining my flashlight in that direction, I saw 
what appeared could possibly be marijuana. I asked the question, "Is it 
possible that someone may have smoked marijuana in your vehicle?" and she 
basically said it is possible; that she lent the car to somebody for a week, and 
that subject could have smoked marijuana in mat vehicle. Based on all that, I 
felt I had an obligation to investigate further. 
(R. 129 at 17-18). 
The trooper testified that she was not hostile or threatening in any way (R. 129 at 
19). She was evasive and nervous (R. 129 at 19). The driver was not aggressive (R. 129 at 
19). In attempting to justify why he searched her pockets, he testified, 
Well, she had removed two bags from the vehicle before exiting the 
vehicle. As she was walking towards me, she had both hands in her pockets. 
She was wearing two layers of clothes. She was wearing a large pair of 
camouflage pants over other clothing. She also, she had a large sweater on. 
And as she's walking towards me, after she removes her hands from her 
pockets, I could see both of her pockets are bulging, and she's also very 
nervous and very evasive, doesn't want to come into contact with me. 
Well, I wanted to first make sure there was no weapons, which there 
could have been weapons in the bags which she removed from the vehicle, 
And it's possible mat she was, also, removing contraband; yes. 
(R. 129 at 21-22). 
RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
The trial court's ruling read, in relevant part, 
The critical issue for decision is whether the officer had a reasonable 
7 
suspicion of criminal activity that justified expanding the scope and length of 
the original stop, and whether the search of defendant's pocket was justified 
by probable cause and exigent circumstances or another exception to the 
warrant requirement 
Hie State argues that expansion of the original stop was justified 
because: 
1. Defendant's motions appeared to be accelerated, as if she were 
under the influence of a stimulant. 
2. Defendant kept looking at the seat and the floor. 
3. Defendant picked up a brown leather purse and put it between her 
legs as if to conceal i t 
4. There was a Crown Royal bag on the seat with something in it 
5. There were green particles in the ashtray that the officer thought 
might be marijuana. 
6. Defendant acknowledged that someone might have used marijuana 
inter vehicle. 
7. Once asked to step out of the vehicle, defendant grabbed two bags 
and put her hands in her pockets, causing the officer to believe she might 
have hidden something in her pockets. Her pockets were bulging. 
The Court agrees with the State that, to this point, the officer hada 
reasonable basis for suspecting that something was amiss, sufficient to justify 
the officer's further inquiry. Since the officer does not claim that the green 
particles actually were marijuana, only that he thought they could be, and 
because human sight is less subject to suggestion than human smell, the rule 
requiring that marijuana actually be found does not apply. An officer who 
stops a vehicle always has the right to require the occupant to step out of the 
vehicle. 
Defendant also claims that the pat down was an improper frisk. The 
court disagrees, F.ven through defendant had not been hostile, her 
movements indicated possible concealment of a weapon. An officer may 
frisk for safety reasons whenever there is a reasonable basis for concern, not 
just when it is more likely than not that a weapon is concealed. Once he 
frisked defendant the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant 
was carrying contraband, and the exigent circumstances are obvious here. 
(R. 26-28). 
StMMARY OF MOUMPNTS 
The trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous in indicating that the 
8 
evidence implied that Lafond was under the influence of a stimulant, that the trooper 
thought the particles in the cup holder were marijuana, and that Lafond acknowledged mat 
someone may have been using marijuana in her car. 
The trial court's legal analysis was incorrect, because the trial court failed to apply 
the law requiring questions asked in the course of a traffic stop to be limited in their scope, 
foiled to recognize that Trooper Salis searched I^fond, rather than frisked her, when he did 
not even have a lawful basis for a frisk. The search of Lafond did not constitute a valid 
"plain feeFsearch, because the trooper had no lawful basis for frisking Lafond, and because 
the contents of her pocket did not necessarily feel incriminating. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to 
suppress and remand this matter to the trial court for withdrawal of Lafond's plea and 
dismissal of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COWTERREPmDENYINO 
THE MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS. 
The trial court's first factual finding that Lafond's accelerated movements implied 
mat she was under the influence of a stimulant is clearly erroneous. 
While there is evidence to marshall in support of the finding that Lafond moved 
rapidly as she was searching for the documentation he asked for (R. 129 at 7), there was no 
testimony whatsoever that the speed of her movements implied the use of stimulants. 
9 
Moreover, the presence of the small green flakes and the Crown Royal bag implied 
depressants, if anything. 
The trial court's fifth finding that the trooper thought the green particles in the cup 
holder might be marijuana is misleading unless read in light of me trooper's testimony that 
he did not know what the particles were. 
While the officer's initial direct testimony that he "believed the green particles were 
marijuana" may be marshaled in support of the finding five (R. 129 at 7), the remainder of 
his testimony clearly demonstrates mat he had no idea what the particles were. He testified 
that as she was looking for the registration, the trooper shone his flashlight inside the car 
and sawa very small number of very small green particles ina cup holder and believed they 
were marijuana (R. 129 at 7). He admitted that he could not say one way or another if they 
were (R. 129 at 15). He admitted that he was uncertain if they were marijuana (R. 129 at 
15-16). Ultimately, no marijuana was found in the car (R. 129 at 10). 
The trial court's sixth finding, that Lafond acknowledged that someone might have 
used marijuana in her car, can be supported by marshaling the trooper's testimony to this 
effect (R. 129 at 8). However, it is misleading because it does not fairly reflect Lafond's 
statement in context. She explained that she had lent the car to a friend of hers for about a 
week, and had just retrieved it that morning, and thus was unsure if anyone had used 
marijuana in her car, but did not mink so (R. 129 at 8). 
IL THE TRIAL COURTS LEGAL ANALYSIS WAS INCORRECT. 
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A. THE TROOPER'S QUESTIONING VIOLATED THE SCOPE OF THE STOP. 
The trial court failed to apply the basic Fourth Amendment law, that in conducting a 
traffic stop, an officer may not ask questions which exceed the scope of the stop unless he 
has a reasonable suspicion to justify the questions. £g£, g&, % | e y r*»pe* 873 P.2d 
1127,1132 (Utah 1994). 
As this Court explained in State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353,17 P.3d 1135, 
cert granted. 26 P3d 35,2001 Utah LEXIS 102, in which this Court found that an officer 
exceeded the scope of a traffic stop with his questioning, 
hi reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, we consider two questions: 
Whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the 
interference in the first place.'" With respect to the first question, a police 
officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' presence." 
The second question in reviewing the legality of a traffic stop is 
whether the stop was reasonably related in scope to the traffic violation 
which justified it in the first place. "Once a traffic stop is made, the 
detention 'must be temporary and last no longer man is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" Both "the length and scope of the 
detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by* the circumstances which 
rendered its initiation permissible." Therefore, 
an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a 
driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has 
produced a valid license and evidence of entitlement to use the 
vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without 
being subject to further delay by police for additional 
questioning." 
Investigative questioning that former detains the driver must be 
supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. 
Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts 
11 
drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of 
the stop." 
2000 UT App. t f 9,11,17 P.3d at 1139. 
In Hansen, the traffic stop was based on an improper turn and lack of insurance. 
2000 UT App Tj 2; 17 P.3d 1135,1137. After checking Hansen's information by computer, 
and returning his documentation, the officer asked him if his car contained any "alcohol, 
weapons or drugs," and when Hansen indicated in the negative, the trooper asked for 
permission to search to make sure. 2000 Utah App at ^  4,17 P.3d at 1137. In Hansen, the 
Court first had to explain mat Hansen was detained at the time of the officer's questions 
about the contents of his car, despite the fact that the officer had returned his 
documentation, because the facts would not have indicated to a reasonable person in 
Hansen's circumstances mat he was free to leave. §§£ 2000 UT App at 12*14. 
In the instant matter, the trooper began asking incriminating questions before he had 
even checked the license and registration, and he certainly had not issued a ticket or 
returned the car occupants' documentation. As in Hansen, the questioning occurred during 
a detention, rather than a conseiisud encounter. Cf M-
As in Hansen, where there was no basis for an officer to ask questions about the 
contents of the car in the course of an ordinary traffic stop, there was no basis for asking 
questions of Ms. Lafond. 
Here, the purpose for the traffic stop was speeding and a license plate light 
equipment violation (R. 129 at 4-6), and the trooper had no basis for asking if there was 
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anything illegal, if there were weapons or alcohol or marijuana in the car, or if anyone had 
smoked marijuana in the car recently. 
The trial court failed to recognize that nervousness alone does not create a 
reasonable suspicion, both because the perception of nervousness is so subjective, 
particularly when the officers are not previously acquainted with the citizens, and because 
nervousness in police-citizen encounters is normal S§§, ejk State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 
431,436 (Utah App. 1990). 
The mere fact that Lafond picked up a small coin or cigarette purse and put it 
between her tegs when the officer was watching what she was doing (R. 129 at 7) certainly 
did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. £f. State v. Schjosser. 774 
P.2d 1132,1136-38 and n.5 (Utah 1989).2 
2
 In rejecting a claim of reasonable suspicion founded on an allegedly furtive 
movement by a car passenger, the Schlosser court stated, 
Mere furtive gestures of an occupant of an automobile do not give rise to an 
articulable suspicion suggesting criminal activity. See People v. Superior 
Court of Yolo County. 3 Cal. 3d at 821-24,478 P.2d at 457-59,91 Cal. 
Rptr. at 737-39 (passenger's actions of turning and putting her arm over the 
back of the seat, then facing forward, bending down towards floor, and then 
resuming normal position did not support probable cause to search); Spence 
v. State. 525 So. 2d 442 (Ha. App. 1988) (leaning down as if putting 
something on floorboard did not justify officer's suspicion); People v. 
Mills. 115 DL App. 3d 809,450 N.E.2d 935,71 111. Dec. 247 (1983) 
(defendant's fast movements and leaning forward as officer approached did 
not create reasonable suspicion). ££. State v. Cyr. 501 A.2d 1303 (Me. 
1985) (occupant of vehicle, in heavy crime area late at night, ducking down 
as if to avoid detection as officer drove by constituted basis for articulable 
suspicion). 
ScWosser's movements, turning to the left and to the right, appearing 
fidgety, bending forward, and turning to look at the officer, do not, without 
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Possession of a Crown Royal bag and the presence of unidentified green flecks in a 
cup holder do not give rise to reasonable suspicion, particularly where no suspicious odors 
are present. §££, g ^ Reid v. Georgia. 448 U.S. 438,441 (1980) (conduct which 
"describes a very large category of presumably innocent travelers" does not give rise to 
reasonable suspicion). 
Because the trooper violated the scope of the traffic stop with his improper 
questioning, the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress. See Hansen. See also 
United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812,816 (10* Cir. 1991Xcited in Hansen: trooper 
violated scope of traffic stop when he asked questions unrelated to speeding or entitlement 
to operate car, because defendant's entitlement to operate car apparently satisfied the 
officer, and his nervousness, shaky hands and poor dexterity in the traffic stop did not 
justify questions regarding contents of car). 
B. THE TROOPER'S SEARCH OF MS. LAFOND WAS NOT BASED ON PROBABLE 
CAUSE OR EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES. 
more, show a reasonable possibility that criminal conduct had occurred or 
was about to occur. Schlosser may have been attempting to locate a driver's 
license. He could have been preparing for conversation with the officer by 
turning down the volume on the radio or extinguishing a cigarette. He may 
also have been putting away food and beverages, changing a baby's diaper, 
putting on the parking brake or doing a host of other innocuous things. 
When confronted with a traffic stop, it is not uncommon for drivers and 
passengers alike to be nervous and excited and to turn to look at an 
approaching police officer. See State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181,184 (Utah 
1987). A search based on such common gestures and movements is a mere 
"hunch," not an articulable suspicion that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. 
Sshfesssr. at 1137-38. 
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The trial court was incorrect in characterizing the trooper's conduct toward Ms. 
Lafond as a frisk, because the officer required her to identify and produce the contents of 
her pockets from the outset (R. 129 at 9), and this conduct exceeds a frisk and constitutes a 
search, requiring probable cause and exigent circumstances as prerequisites. See. e.g.. 
Sihronv. New York. 392 U.S. 40,64-655 (1968Xsearch for evidence exceeds Terrv pat-
down); Urnted States y. Santillanes. 84S F.2d 1103,1109 (10th Cir. 1988Xofficer's search 
of contents of defendant's pockets exceeded proper Terrv frisk and was unlawful because 
not supported by probable cause); State v. LaroccoT 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990Xwarrantless 
search requires proof of exigent circumstances and probable cause under Article I § 14 of 
Utah Constitution); State v. Hodson. 866 P.2d 556,560 (Utah App. 1993Xto justify 
warrantless body search, government must establish probable cause, exigent circumstances, 
and reasonable method of search), rev'd on other grounds. 907 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1995). 
Probable cause is defined as a "lair probability that contraband or evidence of a 
crime will be found." Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213,238 (1983). 
Exigent circumstances are present if the government can prove that resorting to a 
warrant would jeopardize evidence or the safety of the police or publk. Hodson. supra. 
866P.2dat561. 
Because neither the trooper nor the trial court recognized that the officer's conduct 
exceeded a frisk and constituted a seaid^ 
probable cause, or exigent circumstances. By reviewing the preliminary hearing transcript, 
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summarized in the statement of facts, supra, this Court can readily determine that the 
search was not supported by probable cause or exigent circumstances. 
The trooper's testimony regarding his search of Ms. Lafond was as follows: 
Well, she had removed two bags from the vehicle before exiting the 
vehicle. As she was walking towards me, she had both hands in her pockets. 
She was wearing two layers of clothes. She was wearing a large pair of 
camouflage pants over other clothing. She also, she had a large sweater on. 
And as she's walking towards me, after she removes her hands from her 
pockets, I could see both of her pockets are bulging, and she's also very 
nervous and very evasive, doesn't want to come into contact with me. 
Well, I wanted to first make sure there was no weapons, which there 
could have been weapons in the bags which she removed from the vehicle. 
And it's possible that she was, also, removing contraband; yes. 
(R. 129 at 21-22). 
This testimony confirms that the officer was suspicious and curious, but not acting 
pursuant to probable cause or exigent circumstances. See e.g.. Gates. Hodson. supra. 
Because the trooper violated the Fourth Amendment and Article I § 14 in searching 
Lafond, suppression is in order. See Wong Sim v. United States, 371 U.S- 471 
(1963Xexclusionary rule applies to Fourth Amendment violation); Larocco. supra 
(adopting exclusionary rule under state constitution). 
C. IF THE TROOPER'S CONDUCT AMOUNTED ONLY TO A FRISK, IT WAS STILL 
UNJUSTIFIED. 
Assuming argwera/o mat the trooper's conduct amounted only to a frisk, in 
condoning the frisk despite the officer's testimony that he perceived no threat from Ms. 
Lafond (R. 129 at 19), the trial court overlook^ fimdamen^ 
16 
justified unless the officer perceives a danger to his safety. See, £&, State v. White. 856 
P.2d 656,660 (Utah App. 1993). 
As this Court recently recognized in State v. Warren. 2001 UtApp. 346,37 P.3d 
270, there are two circumstances in which an officer may conduct a fiisk: if the person 
being frisked behaves in a threatening manner, or if the crime under suspicion is inherently 
likely to involve a weapon. 2001 UtApp 346 at f 15. While the officer here did go on at 
some length regarding the nature of Ms. Lafond's clothing (R. 129 at 21-22, supra), he did 
not testify that there was a bulge that seemed like a weapon, that she hesitated in denying 
that she was armed, or that she approached him in an aggressive manner. £ejg Warren at f 
15 (fiisk may be justified of "a suspect with a bulge in his doming that appears to be a 
weapon or a suspect who. is hesitant in denying that he is armed and aggressively 
approaches the officer immediately upon being stopped."). Rather, the officer testified mat 
Lafond was not threatening or hostile in any way, but was evasive (R. 129 at 21-22). 
Just as mis case did not involve a fiisk required by a threatening suspect, this case 
did not involve any investigation of a crime likely to involve a weapon, such as homicide, 
robbery or large scale drag dealing. Warren, but involved the presence of a Crown Royal 
bag in a car and a very small quantity of unidentified and odorless small green flakes in a 
cup holder in a car. 
In short, these facts did not justify a frisk. ££ $&. Warren. 
a THE FRISK DID NOT PROVIDE PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE SEARCH. 
17 
Assuming but not conceding that the trooper only conducted a frisk, and that it was 
lawfully justified, the trial court erred in ruling that the frisk provided probable cause for a 
search, because under the plain touch exception to the warrant requirement, the government 
must make three showings: that the officer must have been in a lawful position when he 
touched the object, mat the criminal nature of the object must have been readily apparent, 
and that the officer must have had a lawful right of access to the object, gee, e.g.. 
Minnesotav Dickerson. 508 U.S. 366,375-73 (1993). 
Here, the officer had no business frisking Lafond, subpoint C, supra, and the 
contents of her pocket were not necessarily criminal in nature on the basis of their plain 
feel. The officer testified that he patted down the pocket and felt what he believed was a 
pipe, and then reached in her pocket and removed a torch, a glass pipe, and a glass jar 
containing suspected methamphetamine (R. 129 at 9-10). Regardless of which of these 
three items he felt through the outside of the pocket, none of them were readily identifiable 
as incriminating in character prior to the further search. CL Dickerson at 379, (search not 
justified on plam feel, because lump of cocaine felt during frisk was not readily identifiable 
as incrimisatiiig in character, but required further search). 
Conclusion, 
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying the motion to suppress, and 
remand this case to the trial court for withdrawal of Ms. Lafond's conditional plea and 
dismissal of mis case. 
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DATED this 'O day of MA7 .,2002. 
>PY J. MORGAN 
Counsel for Ms. Lafond 
CERTMCATE OF DELIWRY/MAJLINq 
I hereby certify that I have caused to be served two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to Utah Attorney Genera! Mark ShortferT, 160 East 300 South, 6* Floor, Salt 
Lake City, UT 84114-0854, this ^ day of /UUKI 2002. 
[organ 
Counsel for Ms. Lafond 
I hereby certify that I hand-delivered/roailed, first class postage pre-paid, two tine 
and correct copies of the foregoing to Utah Attorney General Mark Shurtleff, 160 East 300 
SoutiL6ft Floor. Salt Lake City. UTS4114-0854. this 1*1 davof L{kj . 
2002. 
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COUR 
Grand County 
FILED
 D E C Q 5 2001 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COU$£— 5537—-
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Criminal No. 0117-056 
Held in the Courtroom of said Court, at Moab, Grand 
County, State of Utah, on December 4, 2001, present the Honorable 
Lyle R. Anderson, District Court Judge. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Against: ROBIN MARIE LAFOND, 
DOB: 10/01/1964 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT TO UTAH STATE PRISON 
William L. Benge for Plaintiff 
Happy Morgan for Defendant 
This being the day and hour fixed for pronouncing 
judgment in this case, and the defendant being present in Court 
and represented by counsel, and defendant having heretofore 
entered a plea of guilty to the offense of: ILLEGAL POSSESSION 
OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, to-wit: methamphetamine, a Second 
Degree Felony, and the defendant stating to the Court that there 
is no legal reason to advance why judgment should not be 
pronounced, the Court now pronounces the judgment and sentence of 
the law as follows, to-wit: That you, ROBIN MARIE LAFOND, be 
1 
imprisoned in the UTAH STATE PRISON for a term of NOT LESS THAN 
ONE (1) YEAR NOR MORE THAN FIFTEEN (15) YEARS. 
You, ROBIN MARIE LAFOND, are hereby REMANDED to the 
custody of the Sheriff or other proper officer of the Grand 
County Jail for transfer to the custody of the Utah State Prison. 
DATED this day of December, 2001. 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on the ^) day of December, 
2001, I hand delivered or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the above to Happy Morgan, Attorney for 
Defendant, 8 South 100 East, Moab, Utah 84532; Department of 
Corrections, Adult Probation and Parole, 1165 S. Hwy. 191, St. 3, 
Moab, Utah 84532; Grand County Sheriff, 125 E. Center, Moab, 
Utah 84532. 
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